Map the dependency
Identify a material, component, or capability the target regime cannot produce at scale. Trace the global supply from producer to intermediary to end user.

The Dekleptocracy Project is a research program of Anti-Corruption Action. We use anti-corruption methods to find the chemicals, parts and money that Russia's war cannot do without. Each one is a lever the West can pull without firing a shot.
The Dekleptocracy Project is a research program of Anti-Corruption Action, a Virginia 501(c)(3) nonprofit. We find the foreign suppliers Russia's war economy cannot replace. Then we put that evidence in front of the governments that write sanctions, the prosecutors who enforce them and the journalists who cover them.
Washington's posture toward Moscow may shift with every administration. Ours does not. A free Ukraine is the firewall that protects every other free society from a kleptocratic order spreading east to west.
We are researchers. Our tools are open-source financial and supply-chain analysis, the same tools that uncover money laundering. They map where Russia's war machine depends on a handful of foreign suppliers. Each dependency is a lever the West can pull without escalation.
“Violating sanctions is, in practice, money laundering. Money laundering is something we are very good at finding.”



By Andrew Fink for The Dekleptocracy Project · February 2026
Russia exports oil. Russia cannot refine it on its own. The catalysts, additives and feedstocks that turn crude into gasoline, jet fuel, lubricants and tire rubber are made at industrial scale by a small number of firms worldwide. Several are not in Russia.
Our study traces those dependencies node by node. It names the producers, the intermediaries and the trading firms. The same method applies anywhere a hostile state relies on materials it cannot make. The chemical industry is the first case. It will not be the last.
The substances that crack crude oil into usable fuels. Russia does not manufacture them at scale.
Without them, modern engines and tanks seize. Global production is concentrated in a handful of firms.
Military logistics run on tires. Tires run on chemistry Russia imports.
Firms in third countries that re-route restricted goods. Each is a discrete enforcement target.
Ongoing
We are always working on projects like this one. We record what we learn as we go: which signals worked, which trade routes shifted, which sanctions had teeth and which did not. Each project becomes a public report and a playbook for the next authoritarian supply chain.
Violating sanctions is, in practice, money laundering, and we are experts at catching money launderers. We use sanctions law as the legal backstop that brings consequences to the companies profiting from Russia's invasion.
Identify a material, component, or capability the target regime cannot produce at scale. Trace the global supply from producer to intermediary to end user.
Concentrate on nodes where production is held by a handful of firms or routed through a small number of trading houses. These are pressure points.
Sanctions evasion looks, on paper, exactly like money laundering. Apply standard anti-money-laundering techniques to surface beneficial owners, shell companies and shadow fleets.
Deliver the evidence to enforcement bodies, journalists, allied governments and the public. Each disclosure narrows the regime’s options without firing a weapon.

The same approach works against any regime whose economy depends on goods it cannot produce. The leverage it creates is an alternative to military escalation. The cost is the cost of researchers and analysts, a fraction of one cruise missile.
Short essays naming the chokepoints, intermediaries and enablers keeping Russia's war machine supplied.

Kremlev is more than just an oligarch.
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The point of all of this
Russia cannot produce the basic technology its own war machine depends on. It has to buy it from the West. The people and companies selling that technology to Moscow profit from the invasion. That flow of goods is what we exist to interrupt.
Monthly Chosun's Korean-language exclusive on DL E&C's turbine-oil shipment to Russia's Amur Gas Chemical Complex quotes The Dekleptocracy Project on why an export license and a civilian end user do not shield the banks behind the deal from U.S. secondary sanctions.
Read the articleNewsweek's investigation into Reliance Industries' refinery-catalyst exports to Russia drew on data shared with The Dekleptocracy Project and our translation of Russia's priority chemicals list.
Read the articleThe Guardian on the research approach behind The Dekleptocracy Project.
Read the articleReuters on the U.S. sanctions against Arctic LNG 2, the project our research helped shut down.
Read the articleMore coverage is collected at Anti-Corruption Action.
Every dollar funds the analysts, attorneys and investigators who trace the supply chains that keep Russia's war machine running and name the firms behind them. The Dekleptocracy Project is a program of Anti-Corruption Action, a Virginia 501(c)(3). Donations are tax-deductible to the fullest extent permitted by law.
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